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Abstract
This paper documents interethnic and interfaith marriage patterns to better understand
which identity-related cleavages matter in sub-Saharan Africa. Using Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) spanning 15 countries, I build a representative sample of women born between
1955 and 1989. Extrapolating to the population of these countries, I find that 20.4% of mar-
riages are interethnic and 9.7% are interfaith, indicating that ethnic and religious differences
are not always barriers. Accounting for diversity levels, both shares are actually similar. Regard-
ing the pooled sample of these 15 countries, the share of interethnic marriages increased, and
there is no country where interethnic marriages became less frequent. The share of interfaith
marriages decreased in the pooled sample. Only in Cameroon did interfaith marriages become
more frequent. The share of Muslim-Christian marriages remained stable in the pooled sample.
The increase in the share of interethnic marriages can only partly be explained by increases in
urbanization and education levels, suggesting that changes in preferences and in social norms
may also be at play. The decrease in the share of interfaith marriages is due to decreasing
levels of religious diversity: traditional religions were replaced by Islam and Christianity. These
results show that some ethnic boundaries became more porous whereas religious boundaries
did not. However, religious boundaries shifted as a result of changes in the religious landscape.
Keywords: Ethnicity, Marriage, Religion, Sub-Saharan Africa.
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1 Introduction
Social identity is an individual characteristic that has long been demonstrated to be complex and
multi-layered (Posner [2005]). However, a large fraction of the literature on sub-Saharan Africa
has relied on a unidimensional view of identity, equating identity with ethnicity. Even though sur-
veys and censuses in most countries now include categories for “mixed race” or “mixed ancestry”,
very few large-scale surveys conducted in African countries include such an option, perpetuating
the idea that ethnic identity is the allegiance to one group or tribe, and to one homeland. More-
over, while the impact of ethnic fractionalization has been investigated1, the manner in which
ethnic identities are formed and maintained has received little attention. As ethnicity is transmit-
ted through descent2, we would expect interethnic marriages to be rare in societies where ethnic
cleavages are rigid: marrying within one’s group is a means for an individual to ensure that her/his
identity is passed down to her/his children3. Intermarriages have long been used to measure the
strength of cleavages within societies (Kalmijn [1998]), as they combine a measure of segregation
(who meets whom and where) and a measure of who is thought to be an acceptable spouse. How-
ever, there is no quantitative evidence on interethnic marriages in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.
This paper aims to fill this gap.
I study interethnic and interfaith marriages in 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa using data
from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). This paper has four aims: providing descriptive
statistics on interethnic and interfaith marriages, discussing results at the extensive margin (mar-
rying outside one’s ethnic group) and the intensive margin (how far outside one’s ethnic group?),
1Since the seminal paper of Easterly and Levine [1997], several works have pointed out the detrimental effects
of ethnic diversity on growth and public good provision (Alesina and Ferrara [2005], Churchill and Smyth [2017],
de la Cuesta and Wantchekon [2016], Gershman and Rivera [2018], Go¨ren [2014]), with only a few surveys reaching
different conclusions (Gisselquist et al. [2016]).
2Chandra [2006] defines ethnic membership as “determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associ-
ated with, descent”. Kanbur et al. [2011] summarize debates over definitions of ethnic identity and of related measures.
In this paper, I define ethnic groups based on DHS classification, and I do not discuss how intermarriages could have
influenced or determined these classifications.
3Bisin and Verdier [2000] develop a model of transmission of identity across generations and find that intermarriages
result in minority-group parents having access to a weaker socialization technology. In sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic
fractionalization does not necessarily result in majority-minority settings. I nonetheless expect the theoretical result put
forward to hold: high shares of intermarriage should be associated with weaker ethnic/religious affiliations for parents
and their children.
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assessing time trends, and analyzing which factors have contributed to the time trends. Con-
trasting interethnic with interfaith marriages provides a broader picture of intermarriage patterns
in African countries, but it must be emphasized that religious identity is more fluid than ethnic
identity, as conversion allows individuals to change their religious affiliation.
First, I find that 20.4% of married women are in an interethnic union, contrasting with 9.7%
being in an interfaith union. Interethnic unions are hence far from rare events in sub-Saharan
countries, and their share ranges from 10.4% in Burkina Faso to 46% in Zambia. Interfaith mar-
riage shares range from 1.8% in Niger to 19.3% in Cote d’Ivoire. Second, using a sample of women
born between 1955 and 1989, I find that interethnic marriages became more common for later-
born cohorts relative to earlier-born ones, while interfaith marriages became less common. There is
no country where the share of interethnic marriages decreased, and interfaith marriages increased
only in Cameroon. Third, building on recent research on how to measure ethno-linguistic diversity
(Desmet et al. [2016], Gershman and Rivera [2018]), I compute new linguistic distance measures
that allow me to take into account diversity within and across countries. In the case of interfaith
marriages, I do not use a distance measure but instead study Muslim-Christian marriages sepa-
rately, as this type of union is arguably the most distant kind of interfaith marriage in sub-Saharan
Africa. I find that changes at the extensive margin do not translate into changes at the intensive
margin. Interethnic marriage shares increased, but there is no clear pattern regarding variation in
linguistic distance. Interfaith marriage shares decreased, but Muslim-Christian marriage shares re-
mained stable. Fourth, I examine whether time trends on intermarriage shares can be explained by
increased education and urbanization levels. To do so, I compare time trends across specifications
with controls and without controls. The results for interethnic marriages point at the fact that,
while education and urbanization play a role in the increase of interethnic marriage shares, part
of the increase could come from changes in norms and preferences about interethnic marriages.
Likewise, I find that urbanization and education are not the key drivers of the decrease in inter-
faith marriages: this decrease is mostly due to the decreased levels of religious diversity over time.
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This study of intermarriages finds that some – though not all – ethnic boundaries became more
porous. Religious boundaries did not become more porous, but the religious landscape changed
as traditional religions were replaced by Islam and Christianity. Finally, I confirm that my results
are robust to varying definitions of intermarriages. I also test the hypothesis that spouses become
more similar as the length of their marriage increases. Ethnic “assimilation” does not drive the
results. However, there is evidence of conversion during marriage: my estimate is a lower bound
on the decline of interfaith marriages.
This paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, this paper extends the empiri-
cal literature on intermarriages (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen [2006]; Fryer Jr [2007]; Furtado and
Theodoropoulos [2011]; Monden and Smits [2005]; Qian and Lichter [2007]; Qian and Lichter
[2011]). Second, it contributes to a growing literature that nuances or contests the idea that
ethnicity is always the key cleavage in sub-Saharan Africa. Contributions have suggested that
which identity category is salient depends on the context (Eifert et al. [2010]; Miles and Rochefort
[1991]). Looking at the micro-level literature, Berge et al. [2018] show that there is little evidence
of co-ethnic bias in behavior games, contradicting results based on Implicit Association Tests (IAT)
(such as Habyarimana et al. [2007] in Uganda; Lowes et al. [2015] in DRC). The complexity of re-
lationships between ethnic groups (at the political level) was emphasized by Francois et al. [2015]
and Mozaffar et al. [2003] regarding electoral coalitions and power sharing. Simson [2018] shows
that once education is controlled for, public sector jobs in Kenya and in Uganda are rather equitably
distributed along ethnic lines. Third, this paper adds to the literature comparing the evolution and
salience of ethnic and religious cleavages (McCauley [2014]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 lists factors
that could explain the prevalence of intermarriages. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy used.
Section 5 reports results on the pooled sample and section 6 results at the country-level. Section 7
tests alternative stories and provides robustness checks on the findings. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Data
In this section, I present the data sources used and explain how the sample is built.
Data sources: DHS and Ethnologue
I use Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) that were implemented in sub-Saharan Africa (sur-
veys used listed in Table 7, Appendix A). DHS questionnaires procure information on who is mar-
ried4 to whom (within the household), and in specific countries and waves, these questionnaires
also procure information on respondents’ ethnic and religious identity. The descriptive sample in-
cludes the 25 countries with information on ethnic identity5. The main sample is made up of 15
countries for which there are at least two survey waves that gather information on the ethnic and
religious identity of respondents: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, Togo, and Zambia. The main sample is
made up of women born between 1955 and 1989 and of their husbands.
Additionally, I exploit the Ethnologue dictionary (Simons and Fennig [2017]) to get information
on the classification of each ethnic group’s traditional language. I use these classifications to
compute the linguistic distance of all of the pairs of ethnic groups. For each pair, I identify the
lowest common linguistic node that they share and compute the number of nodes between each
group and the common node. The mean of these two distances is the linguistic distance of this
pair (detailed methodology in Appendix B).
4Throughout the paper I use the terms “marriage,” “spouse,” “husband,” and “wife” to refer to married couples as
well as to cohabiting couples.
5These 25 countries are the 15 countries from the main sample, plus Central Africa Republic, Chad, the Republic of
the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia,
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The countries included in this study are not a random sample of African countries. Including
a question on the respondent’s ethnic identity is not a decision made independently from whether ethnicity matters in a
country: the sample above cannot be considered to be representative of countries that did not include such a question
in DHS.
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Comparability over time: Reweighting and recoding
The main sample includes at least two data waves for each country, thus raising issues about
comparability over time. I explain briefly the steps taken to ensure that I can identify time trends
using this sample (the online Appendix details the processes used in this study).
The main sample is made up of women born between 1955 and 1989: for each year within this
period, the sample includes women from all of the 15 countries of the main sample. I reweight the
sample to make it representative of the population of married women in each country. Reweighting
and selecting the time period 1955-1989 ensure that the share of each country remains (roughly)
constant over time. Changes over time are hence not due to changes in the respective weights of
countries in the sample over time.
I recode both ethnic and religious categories to build a classification that fulfills two criteria.
First, the classification does not vary within a country. Second, for all of the cohorts and sur-
vey waves, all of the groups listed in this classification have a least one member of each gender.
Grouping in fewer categories mechanically decreases the number of unions appearing as intereth-
nic/interfaith, so a time-invariant classification is needed to measure changes over time. After
recoding, ethnic classifications are specific to each country and include less than 10 categories for
most countries6. The category “other (ethnicity)” groups together members of ethnic groups that
were not listed in all waves, people who did not identify with a specific group, and foreign nation-
als. Recoding religious classifications makes apparent a key change during the survey period: the
surge of Pentecostalism in Africa (Mayrargue [2004], Meyer [2004]). Changes in classification are
likely to reflect the agenda of church leaders, as “new Churches” have an interest in being formally
recognized in order to proselytize, which is not the behavior of faiths less invested in proselytizing,
such as traditional religions. Because new faith groups continue to be listed, harmonizing nomen-
clatures across waves requires a high level of aggregation: Christian, Muslim, other. The category
6Depending on the countries, ethnic classifications became more or less detailed. For instance, Akan subgroups are
listed separately in Ghana in the older survey waves but are only listed as “Akan” in the recent survey waves. However,
the reverse phenomenon happened in Kenya, where groups listed together (Meru/Embu) are listed separately in more
recent survey waves.
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“other (faith)” includes followers of traditional religions, atheists, and members of new religious
movements that cannot be linked to Christianity or Islam. Among the women who belong to the
“other (faith)” group, at least 41.8% identify with a traditional religion. It is a lower bound on
their share, as many survey waves do not distinguish traditional religions from other faiths that do
not belong to Christianity or Islam.
Variables: Intermarriages and individual characteristics
To study intermarriages, I build variables that measure intermarriages as well as variables that are
likely to influence the likelihood of intermarriage.
Ethnic and religious identity are self-declared in the DHS: I hence consider that the respon-
dent’s answer is a measure of their “true identity”. A marriage is interethnic (interfaith) if the
spouses’ answers correspond to different ethnic (faith) categories in the recoded classification.
Ethnic and religious identity categories may be fluid and change, especially in the case of conver-
sion for marriage. I discuss how religious conversion and ethnic “assimilation” might affect my
results in section 7.
I consider two main variables that can lead to intermarrying: education and urban residence.
The DHS include little retrospective information, so I cannot reconstruct the individual characteris-
tics at the time that the marriage started. Marriage decisions are taken based on the characteristics
of individuals but also on expectations, such as joining a spouse in the city or being able to graduate
high school. I use characteristics at survey date to proxy for past characteristics and expectations:
current characteristics do not perfectly correspond to past characteristics but allow me to take into
account (realized) expectations. I use information on the highest completed level of education at
survey date, which should be a good proxy of the level of education at the time that the union
was formed7. I use urban residence at the survey date. Migration mostly takes place from ru-
7It is unlikely that women can stay in school after getting married. Considering only women in union who have
attended primary school, I find that, under the assumption that girls start school at age 8, 69% of women started their
first cohabitant union at least two years after completing their schooling, 21% around the same time as they completed
their schooling, and 10% before that.
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ral to urban areas8: the current place of residence captures some unobserved characteristics of
individuals that might be correlated to their propensity to intermarry, such as one’s occupation.
Using this variable thus results in overestimating the relationship between urban residence and
intermarriage.
3 Intermarriages and marriage markets: Preferences, norms, and di-
versity
I provide in this section a framework for interpretation of the models and of the results presented
in the paper.
Types of factors influencing intermarriage shares
In his seminal paper, Kalmijn [1998] distinguishes three factors that could explain the prevalence
of intermarriages: individual preferences, diversity levels within (local) marriage markets, and the
influence of norms and of third parties.
The individual preferences factor gathers all of the preferences that individuals have concerning
their matches on the marriage market. Two main characteristics of matches on the marriage
market are socio-economic resources and cultural resources: people are likely to want to marry
someone whose economic prospects are good and with whom they share values and preferences.
The diversity level factor encompasses all of the channels related to how diverse marriage mar-
kets are. Some societies are highly heterogeneous, and others are more homogeneous, for instance
if there is a majority group. Moreover, spatial segregation affects how diverse local marriage mar-
kets are. Low levels of diversity are associated with low levels of intermarriages (by sheer limitation
due to the numbers of potential spouses from other groups).
8Among women for whom I have information on childhood place of residence, 12.6% of women who live in a rural
area at the time of the survey grew up in an urban area, whereas 41.3% of women living in an urban area grew up in
a rural area. As this sample consists of women belonging to earlier-born cohorts, these figures may be even higher for
later-born cohorts.
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The third parties/norms factor includes the channel of group identification, the one of group
sanctions, and in the case of the setting studied, the fact that members of one’s kin may be directly
responsible for choosing one’s spouse. Field studies have shown transitions from kin-selected to
self-selected marriages, for instance, Bertrand-Dansereau and Clark [2016] (Malawi) and Clark
et al. [2010] (Kenya): elders and parents are less involved in the matching process. Third parties
influence is likely to work against intermarriages (Spo¨rlein et al. [2014]).
DHS variables and the Kalmijn framework
As indicated in section 2, I use two variables that are likely to influence the likelihood of intermar-
riage: education and urban residence. These variables capture aspects of the types of factors listed
above.
Education could affect individual preferences through several channels. Education, especially
secondary and higher, is in many countries conducted in a vehicular language, thus helping to
remove language barriers in marriage markets. Additionally, by transmitting a common culture,
education could switch preferences away from group identification and towards a national identi-
fication. Moreover, higher education takes place in (mixed) urban settings (diversity level factor).
Educated women might have more of a say in the choice of their spouse: third parties may be less
involved in the matching process.
Urban areas are on average more mixed than rural ones: diversity levels are likely to be higher
in cities than in the countryside, and marriage markets are likely to be less segregated. Social
norms may be different in cities, and more accepting of intermarriages.
How did marriage markets change?
My main sample is made up of women born between 1955 and 1989. During this period, several
changes linked to the variables listed above took place. Figure 1 shows a visual representation of
the changes that I can observe in the data. Its left panel shows that education levels as well as
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Figure 1: Changes over time: Education, Urban residence, Diversity levels
0
10
20
30
40
50
19
55
-5
9
19
60
-6
4
19
65
-6
9
19
70
-7
4
19
75
-7
9
19
80
-8
4
19
85
-8
9
Primary only Secondary/Higher
Living in urban area
0
10
20
30
40
50
19
55
-5
9
19
60
-6
4
19
65
-6
9
19
70
-7
4
19
75
-7
9
19
80
-8
4
19
85
-8
9
Religious fractionalization
Share other religion
Sample & data: Women in union, pooled sample. 95% confidence intervals included (except on the measure of religious
fractionalization).
Left panel: Share of women living in urban area, share of women whose highest completed education level is pri-
mary/secondary school. The share of women living in urban areas reflects current place of residence: the magnitude
of the change would be higher using information on type of place of birth.
Right panel: Weighted average of religious fractionalization at country-level and share of women belonging to the group
“other (faith)”
urbanization increased: these changes could lead to higher rates of intermarriages for later-born
cohorts than for earlier born cohorts.
Moreover, another key change took place: the decrease in the religious diversity of the pop-
ulation. The right panel of Figure 1 shows the decrease in the share of people identifying with
faiths other than Islam and Christianity and the associated decrease in religious diversity. Under
the assumption that people meet on a national marriage market and that no other factors affected
interfaith marriages, the decrease in religious diversity will mechanically result in lower interfaith
marriage shares. Under the same assumptions, the share of interethnic marriages should remain
stable, as there is no sizable change in ethnic diversity levels9.
4 Empirical strategy
In this section, I present measures of ethnic and religious diversity and introduce the specifications
used to measure time trends.
9A more thorough discussion of ethnic diversity at the country-level and interethnic marriage patterns can be found
in the online Appendix.
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4.1 Descriptive statistics: Comparisons across countries and across identity cate-
gories
Cross-country comparisons must be done carefully in order to be meaningful: if intermarriage
shares are low in a given country, it could be that, according to the classification used, there is not
much diversity in this country to begin with. As discussed in section 2 in the case of Pentecostal
churches, the classification chosen in each survey cannot be considered as encompassing the same
reality across countries and identity categories. To neutralize this classification effect, I compute
the share of intermarriages that we would observe if individuals were matched randomly in a
national marriage market. This share measures how diverse each country is. It is equivalent to
computing an ethnic fractionalization index (EF) and a religious fractionalization index (RF) for
each (national) marriage market. More formally, this fractionalization measure (Fc) corresponds
to:
Fc = 1 −
n∑
i=1
pwi ∗ pmi
In this equation, c denotes countries. n is the number of ethnic (respectively religious) groups in
the survey. Subscripts w denote women, subscripts m denote men. pwi is the share of married
women who belong to the group i, pmi the share of married men who belong to the group i. I
assume that a person’s decision to marry does not depend on the ethnic and religious identity of
her/his matches. There are no additional entries on or exits from the marriage market compared
to what we observe in the data: polygamous men are thus counted as many times as the number
of their cohabiting wives.
Fractionalization indices do not include any information on how (dis)similar groups are10:
they are useful to identify changes at the extensive margin but do not allow for identification of
10Since the seminal paper by Greenberg [1956], adjusting measures of fractionalization by a measure of similarity
between groups has been suggested to take into account the depth of cleavages: for instance, some ethnic groups speak
the same language (e.g. in Zambia Posner [2005]) while others are very distant according to the linguistic tree (e.g.
the Somali and the Kikuyu, in Kenya). These differences are not taken into account by fractionalization measures: the
distance between all groups is set to be the same.
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changes at the intensive margin.
In the case of ethnicity, I account for these differences by using linguistic distance measures
(detailed methodology in Appendix B). Computing the country-specific random linguistic distance
(d¯c)is done according to the formula below:
d¯c =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pwi ∗ pmj ∗ dij
where dij is the linguistic distance between group i and group j, pwi the share of married
women who belong to the group i, and pmj the share of married men who belong to the group
j. The linguistic distance dii is set to 0. The linguistic distances dzi and diz, where z is the group
“other (ethnicity)”, are set to the median value of the linguistic distance between pairs of ethnic
groups listed in country c.
In the case of religious differences, there is no standard way to quantify the differences between
groups. I study separately interfaith marriages – mixed marriages between Muslims, Christians,
and “other (faith)” – and Christian-Muslim marriages, the latter arguably being the most distant
kind of intermarriage along the religious dimension in sub-Saharan Africa.
4.2 Assessing time trends
I design a simple additive model to estimate trends on intermarriages. My baseline specification
is a linear probability model11 that I run on the pooled sample (including country fixed-effects)
and at the country level. I present below the specifications used at the country level. I specify the
model at the woman level12: individuals (w) are women. This decision is due to the fact that 17%
of women appear with at least one co-wife in the dataset: a woman appears only one time in the
dataset, but a man appears matched with all of his cohabiting wives.
11The results do not change when using a logit model. Results available from the author.
12The results do not change if I study intermarriage by collapsing the dataset to keep one observation per man. In
this case, I consider a man to be in an interethnic (interfaith) union if at least one of his wives is not a member of his
ethnic (religious) group. Results available from the author.
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Model 1 : Time trends
Intermarriagew = α+ β1BirthY earw + β2Agew + β3Age2w + w (1)
Intermarriagew is an indicator variable that equals 100 if the union is interethnic (interfaith),
and 0 otherwise13. I consider unions to be interethnic (interfaith) if spouses do not belong to
the same group. When both spouses belong to the group “other,” I consider them to be in an in-
traethnic (intrafaith) union. In Section 7, I test whether the results are robust to considering these
unions as interethnic (interfaith).
BirthY earw is a continuous variable defined as the year of birth of each woman. It is the main
variable of interest: if the coefficient associated to it is positive, it means that the share of inter-
marriages has increased over time. I use birth year rather than year of first cohabitation to capture
time trends for two reasons. First, birth year is available for all women, while using cohabitation
year would restrict the sample to women in their first union, as I only have information on the
year of first cohabitation. Second, age at marriage or year of cohabitation is endogenous to edu-
cational achievements and to the type of place of residence, while year of birth is more exogenous
to these individual characteristics. I compare birth year to cohabitation year as a robustness check
in Section 7. Agew is the age at survey date.
Age and birth year effects
I add quadratic controls for age in the model to control for age effects. This ensures that the
patterns that I identify in the data are due to change across cohorts and not to age effects14. I
use surveys implemented from 1992 to 2018: women born in 1955 were older than 35 in the first
DHS survey of each country; women born in 1985 were younger than 35. As shown in Figure 2,
13The indicator variable is set to 100 so that coefficients can be read as changes in percentage points.
14This is possible as my main sample is made of up of countries for which I have at least two survey waves. I hence
observe birth cohorts at different ages. Thus, 82.7% of women belong to birth cohorts that were sampled at least twice
in their country. Given the quadratic function that I use to estimate age effects, I do not need all of the cohorts to have
been sampled twice to estimate age effects and birth years effects separately.
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Figure 2: Survey effect: Marital status and age at survey date
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Left panel: The sample includes only women in union at the time of the survey. 95% confidence intervals.
The “maximum age” is the age of the oldest woman surveyed for each birth year. The “minimum age” is
the age of the youngest woman surveyed for each birth year. These ages depend on the timing of surveys
within each country. Women aged 15 to 49 are surveyed in DHS, hence the flat lines at these two points.
Right panel: These shares are computed using all women surveyed. 95% confidence intervals.
“Married women” are the women in union at the time of the survey, not the ever-married women.
the timing of survey waves can be seen in the age composition of cohorts: earlier-born cohorts are
older at survey date than later-born cohorts. Whether a woman is married or not is a function of
age: differences in age composition of cohorts (left panel) are mirrored by differences in the share
of married and remarried women by cohort (right panel). As women in earlier-born cohorts are
older at the survey date, they are more likely to have married and more likely to have remarried,
either after a divorce or being widowed. The same characteristics are likely to drive both the
type of marital status that I observe (married/remarried/never married) and the type of marital
outcome that I observe (intermarried or not). For instance, if women who marry young are more
likely to marry within their group, then, without age controls, I would estimate time trends that
are due to the fact that cohorts differ with respect to their age composition.
Model 2: Time trends with controls
Intermarriagew = α+ β1BirthY earw + β2Agew + β3Age2w
+β4Primaryw + β5Secondaryw + β6Urbanw + β7 ∗Remarriedw + w
(2)
I introduce additional variables in the model to test whether they explain changes in inter-
marriage shares. I assume these variables have a constant effect over time. I add dummies for
13
the highest education level: Primaryw and Secondaryw, the reference category being “no edu-
cation”15. Urbanw is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent lives in an urban area.
Moreover, to control further for cohort composition effects, I add a dummy variable, Remarriedw,
which takes the value 1 if the respondent has remarried. I discuss alternative ways to measure the
impact of remarriage in section 7.
Throughout the paper, I compare the coefficient associated with birth year between the spec-
ification 1 and the specification 2. The birth year coefficient in specification 1 measures time
trends. The birth year coefficient in specification 2 measures time trends that cannot be explained
by changes in education levels, in urbanization, and in cohort composition due to remarriage. As
such, it could capture changes in preferences and in social norms. However, it should be noted
that that several other variables may contribute to individuals’ likelihood to intermarry, such as
parental education, whether one’s parents intermarried, or whether both parents are still alive at
the time of the marriage decision: the coefficient in specification 2 may also capture some of these
omitted factors.
5 Results on pooled sample
This section presents the results on the pooled sample. The country-specific results are detailed in
section 6.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 displays the estimations of observed intermarriage shares and contrasts them with the
intermarriage shares that we would have observed under random matching. Interethnic unions
are on average more frequent than interfaith unions: 20.4% of women are married to a man
who is not from the same ethnic group as them, and 9.7% of women are married to a man who
15DHS classification distinguishes between secondary and higher education. Only 2.3% of married women in my
sample completed university, so I aggregate secondary education and higher education into a single category.
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Table 1: Average intermarriage shares and linguistic distance
Interethnic marriages (%) Linguistic distance (nodes)
Observed Random Ratio N Observed Random Ratio N
20.4 80.0 25.5 97111 3.29 3.25 1.01 21704
Interfaith marriages (%) Muslim/Christian marriages (%)
Observed Random Ratio Na Observed Random Ratio N
9.7 33.8 28.7 96549 2.4 21.7 11.2 83291
Data & sample: Women in union, pooled sample. Weighted data.
Interethnic, interfaith, and Muslim-Christian marriage shares: The observed share cor-
responds to the share observed in the population. The random share corresponds to
the share that we would observe if people currently in union had matched at random,
under two assumptions. First, there is no exit or entry into the marriage market com-
pared to what we observe. Second, polygamy decisions are independent from women’s
ethnicity and religion: Polygamous men appear on the random market the same num-
ber of time as in the observed market. Random shares are computed for each country,
considering a national marriage market. The random share for the pooled sample is
the weighted average of those national random shares. The ratio is computed as the
ratio of observed share to random share.
Linguistic distance: The random and observed linguistic distances are computed consid-
ering a national marriage market, using information on interethnically married couples.
Linguistic distance between two spouses when only one of them belongs to the group
“other (ethnicity)” is set to the country-specific median linguistic distance, computed
on distances for all pairs of ethnolinguistic groups.
Muslim-Christian marriage shares (observed and random) are computed using only
marriages in which neither spouse is member of the group “other (faith)”.
a One survey wave in Senegal does not include a question on religion.
is not a member of the same religious group as them. However, the number of categories and
the level of diversity differ depending on whether we consider ethnicity or faith: under random
matching, we would observe around 80% of interethnic marriages and around 33.8% of interfaith
marriages. When we look at the ratio of the observed share of intermarriages to the random share
of intermarriages, interfaith marriages and interethnic marriages are roughly as common: between
25% and 30% of the random share of intermarriages is realized.
I find that interethnic unions take place at a linguistic distance that is similar to what we would
observe under random matching. In contrast with the fact that 28% of interfaith unions are real-
ized, Muslim-Christian marriages are rare16: they make up 2.4% of marriages when considering
only Muslim and Christian respondents, and 2.1% otherwise. It is 11.2% of what we would observe
under random matching. Most interfaith unions hence involve a spouse who identifies as Muslim
or Christian and a spouse who belongs to the group “other (faith)”. Individuals who are neither
Muslim nor Christian are more likely to be in an interfaith union than Muslims and Christians.
1666.5% of Muslim-Christian unions are unions between a Muslim man and a Christian woman. Most Islamic scholars
consider that it is forbidden for Muslim women to marry non-Muslim men, but Muslim men can marry women who
belong to other monotheist religions. Hence, this imbalance in the types of Muslim-Christian unions indicates that such
unions, while rare, are not only counted due to measurement errors.
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Couples that include at least one follower of “other (faith)” make up 14% of the sample, but 79%
of interfaith couples, most of them taking place between a Christian spouse and an “other (faith)”
spouse. The high propensity of “other (faith)” members to intermarry is consistent with the fact
that traditional religions are more tolerant of intermarriages. It is also likely that the conversion
process from a traditional religion to Islam or to a Christian denomination might not concern both
spouses at the same time.
5.2 Time trends
Assessing time trends
Figure 3 shows the shares of each type of intermarriage over birth cohort of women, thus providing
visual evidence on the magnitude of changes.
Figure 3: Intermarriage shares on pooled sample
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Sample & data: Women in union, pooled sample. 95% confidence intervals
included.
Observed share of intermarriages by birth cohort of women.
Table 2 shows time trends for the three kinds of intermarriages studied: interethnic, interfaith,
and Muslim-Christian marriages. Interethnic marriages are more frequent for women in later-born
cohorts than women in earlier-born cohorts: in column (1), the coefficient for birth year is positive
and significant. After controlling for education, urbanization, and remarriage (column (2)), the
magnitude of the coefficient decreases, but the coefficient itself remains positive and significant.
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This result indicates that other factors, possibly changes in norms and preferences, contributed to
the increase in the share of interethnic marriages.
Table 2: Trends - Intermarriage shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Interethnic marriage Interfaith marriage Muslim-Christian marriage
Birth year 0.265*** 0.168*** -0.179*** -0.149*** 0.0143 0.00461
(0.0421) (0.0403) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0157) (0.0154)
Age 0.428** -0.152 -0.306** -0.305** -0.0307 -0.120
(0.199) (0.197) (0.141) (0.141) (0.0777) (0.0770)
Age squared -0.00515* 0.00202 0.00131 0.00134 0.000225 0.00134
(0.00294) (0.00292) (0.00221) (0.00220) (0.00117) (0.00115)
Primary 2.925*** 0.568 0.568**
(0.637) (0.457) (0.222)
Secondary/Higher 7.914*** -1.512*** 1.339***
(0.787) (0.561) (0.306)
Urban 13.12*** -2.523*** 1.141***
(0.661) (0.414) (0.232)
Remarried 6.443*** 3.808*** 1.650***
(0.643) (0.502) (0.285)
Controls
Country-fixed effects D D D D D D
Observationsa 97111 97111 96549 96549 96549 96549
R-squared 0.247 0.272 0.134 0.139 0.029 0.033
Mean dependent variable 20.4 9.7 2.1
Data & sample: Women in union, pooled sample. Weighted data.
Specification: OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered at the DHS-cluster level. As the specification includes country-fixed effects, there is no
constant in the model.
Columns (1) and (2): the dependent variable is a variable that equals 0 if the union is an intraethnic one, 100 if it is an interethnic one.
Columns (3) and (4): the dependent variable is a variable that equals 0 if the union is an intrafaith one, 100 if it is an interfaith one. Three faith
groups are defined: “Muslim”, “Christian”, and “other (faith)”.
Columns (5) and (6): the dependent variable is a variable that equals 100 if one spouse is Christian and the other one Muslim, and 0 otherwise.
Results for all columns should be read as changes in percentage points.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
a One survey wave in Senegal does not include a question on religion.
Interfaith marriages decreased over time (column (3)) as expected from the decrease in reli-
gious diversity. The share of Muslim-Christian marriages (column (5)) did not vary over time: it
is likely that the norms and preferences concerning interfaith marriages did not change over the
period. Norms concerning religious intermarriages remaining the same is consistent with the fact
that the decrease in interfaith marriages is due to the decrease in religious diversity documented
in section 3 rather than to norms shifting towards less tolerance of interfaith marriages.
Extrapolating the estimations from the model over 25 years (1960-1985), the model (columns
(1) and (3)) estimates an increase of 6.6 percentage points in interethnic marriage shares and
a decrease in interfaith marriage shares by 4.5 percentage points. Once education and urban
residence are controlled for (column (2)), the magnitude of the increase in interethnic marriage
17
shares is 4.2 percentage points. The fact that women in later-born cohorts are more educated and
more likely to live in urban areas than women in earlier-born cohorts explains one-third of the
trend on interethnic marriages. Once education and urban residence are controlled for (column
(4)), the magnitude of the increase in interfaith marriage shares is 3.75 percentage points: these
variables explain little of the trend observed, corroborating the idea that the decrease in interfaith
marriages is mainly due to declining levels of religious diversity.
Assessing individual characteristics
Looking at interethnic marriages and at Muslim-Christian marriages, the coefficients on education
and on urban residence are consistent with what we would expect from variables capturing parts of
the individual preferences factor and of the diversity level factor. Completion of primary school rather
than having no education is associated with a higher likelihood of intermarrying. Completion of
secondary school is associated with an even higher likelihood. Urban residence is also associated
with an increase in the likelihood of intermarriage 17. In the case of interfaith marriages, secondary
education and urban residence are negatively correlated to the likelihood of being in an interfaith
marriage, but these variables capture the likelihood of belonging to the group “other (faith)”.
Members of this group are often followers of traditional religions, and attendance in school and
urban residence are negatively correlated with the likelihood of being a member of this group18.
Remarried women are more likely to be married outside of their group than women who are
still in their first union, whatever the kind of intermarriage considered. Social norms may be
different for women who marry for the first time and for women who remarry, as women have
more freedom in choosing a spouse when they have already been married (Locoh and Thiriat
[1995]). Similarly, earlier-born women may remarry under the same set of (more accepting)
17Using a sample of earlier-born cohorts for which I have information on childhood place of residence, I run the
specifications from Table 2. The coefficient estimated for the current place of residence is slightly higher than the
coefficient for the childhood place of residence.
18 76.6% of women who belong to the group “other (faith)” did not complete primary school while 44.4% of Muslim
and Christian women did not complete primary school. 12.8% of women who belong to the group “other (faith)” live
in an urban area while 28.5% of Muslim and Christian women live in an urban area.
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norms as later-born women who enter their first union. Last, women who remarried may have
different (unobserved) characteristics that also lead them to marry outside of their group, whether
in their first union or in the subsequent ones. I discuss these hypotheses about remarriage in
section 7.
6 Results at country-level
This section presents the descriptive statistics and results on time trends at the country level. For
brevity, tables include only the coefficient associated with the variable BirthY ear and show results
for the two main specifications (with and without controls). The full results at the country level
and the results with control variables introduced one by one are available in the online Appendix.
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 4: Shares of interethnic marriages
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Data: Survey wave (DHS) conducted the closest to 2005. Sample: Women currently in union.
Left panel: Share of interethnic marriages. Right panel: Ratio of observed share to random share of interethnic marriages.
Higher ratios mean that the share of interethnic marriages is closer to what would be observed under random matching.
The corresponding data can be found in the online Appendix.
The maps in figure 4 show the observed share of interethnic marriages and the ratio of the ob-
served to random share of interethnic marriages. Striking differences between countries appear.
19
In Congo-Brazzaville and in Zambia, more than 40% of married women are in an interethnic mar-
riage, whereas this share is lower than 10% in DRC, Kenya, Namibia, and Nigeria. The observed
share and the ratio of observed to random shares are similar. This is because countries have high
random shares of interethnic marriages: there are only two countries where this random share is
lower than 75%.
Figure 5: Shares of interfaith marriages
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Data: Survey wave (DHS) conducted the closest to 2005. Sample: Women currently in union.
Left panel: Share of interfaith marriages. Right panel: Ratio of observed share to random share of interfaith marriages.
Higher ratios mean that the share of interfaith marriages is closer to what would be observed under random matching.
The corresponding data can be found in the online Appendix.
The maps in figure 5 show the observed share of interfaith marriages and the ratio of the ob-
served to random share of interfaith marriages. In stark contrast to interethnic marriage patterns,
the share of interfaith marriages is low. The highest share of interfaith marriages is 29.6% (Congo-
Brazzaville), while the highest share of interethnic marriages is over 40%. However, the level of
religious fractionalization is much lower than the level of ethnic fractionalization, hence the much
darker shades of the map on the right panel. Countries are also more heterogeneous with respect
religious fractionalization, which ranges from 3.6% (Niger) to 64.1% (Benin).
On the pooled sample, ratios of observed to random shares are similar for interethnic and
interfaith marriages shares, but it is not the case when looking at countries separately. Notably, the
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distribution of this ratio is wider when looking at interfaith marriages rather than at interethnic
marriages: there is no country for which this ratio is higher than 60% when looking at interethnic
marriages, but it is higher than 60% for interfaith marriages in Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Namibia,
Niger, and Zambia.
6.2 Time trends on interethnic marriages
6.2.1 Extensive margin
Time trends
Figure 6: Observed interethnic marriage shares over birth cohorts
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Sample & data: Women currently in union, weighted DHS data at country level.
Panel A (left): Countries for which the trend on interethnic marriages is significantly different from 0.
Panel B (right): Countries for which the trend on interethnic marriages is not significantly different from 0.
Countries are sorted into these two panels according to regression results from Table 3. Countries appear in the legend
in descending order with respect to the share of interethnic marriages in the 1985-1889 cohort.
BF: Burkina Faso; CI: Cote d’Ivoire.
Figure 6 presents a visual representation of the changes in the share of interethnic marriages
over time. Panel A shows that trajectories of countries where interethnic marriages became more
frequent look similar. When looking at panel B, we notice that out of six countries where in-
terethnic marriage shares did not increase, three – Zambia, Gabon, Malawi – already had shares
of interethnic marriages higher than 25%. Two countries, Burkina Faso and Niger, are the only
countries in the sample where the ethnic fractionalization index is lower than 70%. They both
have huge majority groups – the Mossi in Burkina Faso, the Hausa in Niger – which may mean that
the context in which unions take place in these two countries is different from what happens in
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countries where there is no majority group in the demographic sense. The exception is Cameroon:
it has a positive but not significant increase in interethnic marriage shares19, while having the
same share of interethnic marriages as the average on the pooled sample, and having no majority
group.
Turning to regression analysis, Table 3 lists the coefficient associated with birth year for two
sets of regressions, without and with the following controls: education, urban place of residence,
and remarriage. The share of interethnic marriages significantly increased over time in Benin,
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Togo, and Uganda (Panel A). In terms of
magnitudes, estimates of a 0.3 increase in percentage points by birth year translate into an increase
of 7.5 percentage points when extrapolating over 25 years. Once I control for the individual
characteristics correlated with interethnic marriages, the trends remain positive and significant in
six countries out of nine: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda. In Ghana, the
coefficient turns insignificant when introducing either education or urban residence to the model.
In Kenya, the coefficient drops when introducing the type of place of residence to the model but
only loses significance when all of the variables are introduced jointly. In the case of Togo, adding
education levels to the model explains away the trend. Looking at Panel B, the introduction of
control variables does not change the results.
Individual characteristics
Countries are strikingly similar with respect to correlates of interethnic marriages, and there are no
differences between countries where interethnic marriage shares increased and countries where
they did not. The results are consistent with what is found in the pooled sample: primary edu-
cation, secondary education, urban residence, and remarriage are all positively correlated to the
likelihood of being in an interethnic union. The two exceptions are Uganda, where women who
attended primary school are less likely than their uneducated counterparts to marry outside of
19While there seems to be a trend for Cameroon on Figure 6, the trend is insignificant when age controls are added.
22
Table 3: Trend - Observed interethnic marriage shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Interethnic marriage Mean N
Birth year coefficient Each cell: coefficient from a separate regression
Panel A: Increase in interethnic marriage shares
Benin 0.242*** 0.176** 15.1 10977
(0.0741) (0.0727)
Cote d’Ivoire 0.254* 0.262* 19.2 2677
(0.136) (0.134)
Ghana 0.262* 0.192 19.4 6487
(0.140) (0.140)
Guinea 0.728*** 0.694*** 14.0 4732
(0.200) (0.203)
Kenya 0.257*** 0.0820 10.5 9169
(0.0624) (0.0538)
Mali 0.253* 0.305** 30.6 8499
(0.130) (0.129)
Senegal 0.326*** 0.177* 23.5 8339
(0.0914) (0.0913)
Togo 0.338*** 0.164 14.4 3701
(0.113) (0.114)
Uganda 0.455*** 0.413*** 24.3 2465
(0.135) (0.123)
Panel B: No change in interethnic marriage shares
Burkina Faso 0.00631 -0.0680 10.4 9170
(0.0856) (0.0849)
Cameroon 0.545 0.215 20.5 3066
(0.332) (0.317)
Gabon 0.364 0.410 38.0 2274
(0.289) (0.278)
Malawi 0.00730 -0.156 31.8 9241
(0.121) (0.120)
Niger -0.154 -0.114 12.7 5603
(0.120) (0.123)
Zambia 0.0675 0.0821 46.0 10711
(0.132) (0.125)
Controls
Age & Age2 D D
Education D
Urban D
Remarried D
Sample & data: Women currently in union, weighted DHS data at country level. Specification: OLS
regressions run separately for the 15 countries of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the
DHS-cluster level. The dependent variable is a variable that equals 0 is the union is intraethnic, 100
if the union is interethnic.
Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficient associated to the birth year variable. Each cell corresponds
to a separate regression. Column (3) reports the mean number of interethnic marriages in the
regression sample. Column (4) reports the number of observations for each country.
Results in columns (1) and (2) can be interpreted as changes in percentage points.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
their ethnic group – when urban residence is controlled for –, and Gabon, where urban residence
is uncorrelated to interethnic marriage. The share of Gabonese women living in an urban areas is
above 80%, while the share of women living in urban areas is lower than 45% in all of the other
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countries: urbanization might stop being a mixing factor once urbanization levels are high.
6.2.2 Intensive margin: Linguistic distance
Descriptive statistics and time trends
Table 4 shows results of the regression of the linguistic distance (conditional on being in an in-
terethnic union) on birth year, and on both sets of controls. Changes at the extensive margin do not
necessarily correspond to changes at the intensive margin. The linguistic distance of interethnic
marriages increased in three countries, two countries where interethnic marriages became more
frequent – Benin and Togo – and one – Cameroon – where interethnic marriages did not increase.
The linguistic distance decreased in Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Senegal, all countries where the
share of interethnic marriage increased. The linguistic distance did not change in the nine other
countries of the sample. Introducing individual characteristics in the model changes the results
only in Uganda, where the trend turns negative. The ratio of the observed to random linguistic
distance (column (4)) is close to one for all countries: conditional to being in an interethnic union,
most of the linguistic distance is realized. Moreover, in seven countries of the sample, this ratio is
larger than one, indicating that interethnic marriages are more distant than they would be if they
were formed at random (considering only intermarried people). There is only one country, Sene-
gal, where this ratio is lower than one and where the linguistic distance of interethnic marriages
decreased.
The evolution of linguistic distances depends on the type of interethnic marriages that are
observed in the earlier-born cohorts. For instance, comparing the cases of Benin and Kenya (lin-
guistic trees for these two countries are depicted in Appendix B), the average linguistic distance
of interethnic marriages decreased in Kenya and increased in Benin. In Benin, as interethnic mar-
riages became more frequent, all groups started intermarrying more, thus resulting in a decrease
of the share of Adja-Fon unions, whose distance is one node, and an increase in the share of unions
with a distance larger than four nodes (e.g. Yoruba-Peulh unions). Increasing linguistic distances
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Table 4: Trend - Linguistic distance between spouses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Linguistic distance Mean Ratio N
Birth year coefficient Each cell: coefficient from a separate regression
Panel A: Increase in interethnic marriage shares
Increase in linguistic distance
Benin 0.0151** 0.0145** 3.4 0.8 1650
(0.00692) (0.00686)
Togo 0.0155** 0.0148* 3.4 1.5 459
(0.00746) (0.00790)
No change in linguistic distance
Ghana 0.0124 0.0102 3.2 1.0 1238
(0.00841) (0.00881)
Guinea 0.0230 0.0151 5.9 1.4 673
(0.0199) (0.0209)
Mali -0.00813 -0.0105 6.6 1.3 2568
(0.00819) (0.00812)
Uganda -0.0170 -0.0209* 1.7 0.7 605
(0.0117) (0.0126)
Decrease in linguistic distance
Cote d’Ivoire -0.0197** -0.0196** 4.0 1.0 515
(0.00941) (0.00876)
Kenya -0.0577*** -0.0460** 3.9 1.2 922
(0.0205) (0.0199)
Senegal -0.0277** -0.0283** 3.5 0.8 1813
(0.0126) (0.0123)
Panel B: No change in interethnic marriage shares
Increase in linguistic distance
Cameroon 0.0779*** 0.0566*** 3.0 0.7 653
(0.0225) (0.0198)
No change in linguistic distance
Burkina Faso -0.0169 -0.0125 4.9 1.2 995
(0.0111) (0.0112)
Gabon 0.00515 0.00530 1.4 0.6 923
(0.00538) (0.00542)
Malawi 0.00144 0.000873 1.8 1.1 3023
(0.00181) (0.00182)
Niger 0.0108 0.0120 4.4 1.3 794
(0.0102) (0.0102)
Zambia -0.00172 -0.00172 1.6 0.9 4873
(0.00269) (0.00261)
Controls
Age & Age2 D D
Education D
Urban D
Remarried D
Sample & data: Women currently in an interethnic union, weighted DHS data at country level. Specification:
OLS regression run separately for the 15 countries of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the DHS-
cluster level. Dependent variable is the linguistic distance (measure defined in Appendix B) associated to
each interethnic union.
Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficient associated to the birth year variable. Each cell corresponds to a
separate regression. Column (3) reports the mean linguistic distance for intermarried couples. Column (4)
reports the ratio of the mean observed linguistic distance to the random linguistic distance, computed by
randomly matching individuals who married outside of their ethnic group. Column (5) reports the number
of observations for each country.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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indicate that women in later-born cohorts marry further away from their group, and hence that
some ethnic cleavages may have lost salience. In Kenya, the decrease in linguistic distance stems
mostly from the fact that in earlier-born cohorts there are more interethnic couples in which at
least one spouse is Kalenjin or Luo – the only two groups that belong to the Nilo-Saharan branch
– than in later-born cohorts20. As interethnic marriages became more common, the share of such
unions among intermarried people decreased, resulting in the decrease of the average linguistic
distance of interethnic unions. This result is still consistent with the fact that some ethnic barriers
– not captured by linguistic distances – are becoming less salient.
Individual characteristics
Correlates of the linguistic distance of interethnic marriages are not the same as correlates of
interethnic marriages: primary and secondary education are negatively correlated to the linguistic
distance of marriage in most countries. Such a reversal between the extensive and the intensive
margin can be explained by ‘over-selection’ of individuals. Higher education levels are correlated
with a higher likelihood of marrying outside of one’s ethnic group, so individuals who marry
outside of their ethnic group and who have also not attended school are likely to have unobserved
characteristics, such as being strong-willed, that also make them marry further away from their
group or marry without any consideration of group differences.
6.3 Time trends on interfaith and Muslim-Christian marriages
Time trends
Figure 7 presents a visual representation of the change in interfaith marriage shares over time.
Comparing the two panels, it appears that countries seem to converge towards low levels of in-
20Linguistic distance does not capture perfectly the cleavages between groups and, contrary to share of intermarriages,
is sensitive to extreme values. For instance, in Kenya, the distance between, on the one hand, the Luo and Kalenjin
groups (Nilo-Saharan branch) and, on the other hand, all other ethnic groups but the Somali is high (over 7.5 nodes).
Interethnic unions in Kenya have an average linguistic distance of 7.2 nodes if at least one of the spouses is Luo or
Kalenjin, and a distance of 3.3 nodes otherwise. Luo-Kalenjin unions themselves make up 1.6% of interethnic unions in
Kenya, despite the fact the linguistic distance of the pair is lower than with other groups, indicating that other factors
than linguistic distance are also at play.
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Figure 7: Observed interfaith marriage shares over birth cohorts
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
55
-5
9
19
60
-6
4
19
65
-6
9
19
70
-7
4
19
75
-7
9
19
80
-8
4
19
85
-8
9
Birth cohort
Gabon
Togo
Ghana
Benin
BF
Kenya
Zambia
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
55
-5
9
19
60
-6
4
19
65
-6
9
19
70
-7
4
19
75
-7
9
19
80
-8
4
19
85
-8
9
Birth cohort
CI
Cameroon
Malawi
Mali
Uganda
Guinea
Niger
Senegal
Sample & data: Women currently in union, weighted DHS data at country level.
Panels A1 and B1 (left): Countries for which the trend on interfaith marriages is negative and significantly different from
0.
Panels A2, A3 and B2 (right): Countries for which the trend on interfaith marriages is not significantly different from 0;
Cameroon (A3) is the only country for which the share of interfaith marriages increased.
Countries are sorted into two panels according to the regression results from Table 5. Countries appear in the legend in
descending order with respect to the share of interfaith marriages in the 1985-1889 cohort.
BF: Burkina Faso; CI: Cote d’Ivoire.
terfaith marriages. Apart from Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire, all of the countries where interfaith
marriages did not become less frequent are countries where the share of interfaith marriages is
lower than 10% for all of the cohorts.
Table 5 shows the coefficient associated with birth year for country-specific regressions of the
likelihood of being in an interfaith union on birth year and on the two sets of additional variables.
Without individual controls other than age, the share of interfaith marriages increased only in
Cameroon. The share of interfaith marriages decreased in Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Ghana,
Kenya, Togo, and Zambia. Controlling for education levels, urban place of residence, and remar-
riage explains the trend in Benin, Gabon, and Togo. In Benin, the trend turns insignificant when
introducing an indicator variable for remarried status. In Togo, the introduction of education vari-
ables as well as of urban residence explains the trend. In Gabon, it is the joint effect of the three
variables.
Muslim-Christian union shares only changed in three countries, decreasing in Ghana and in-
creasing (although to a small extent) in Togo and Uganda. The coefficients are not significant in all
of the other countries, a finding that is consistent with the fact that there is no trend when looking
at the pooled sample (Table 2).
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Crossing these two sets results with results on variation of the share of “other (faith)” over
time (the full results can be found in the online Appendix), I find that the share of “other (faith)”
decreased in all of the countries where the share of interfaith marriages decreased, with the ex-
ception of Zambia. Such share increased only in Senegal and Niger, where there was no decrease
in the share of interfaith marriages. In keeping with results on the pooled sample, decreasing
interfaith marriage shares are likely to be driven by the decline in the share of the group “other
(faith)” and the resulting decrease in the level of religious diversity. However, at the country-level,
education and urbanization suffice to explain the trend in Benin, Gabon, and Togo. In Ghana,
where both interfaith marriages and Muslim-Christian marriages became less common, it is likely
that social norms or preferences are moving away from tolerating interfaith marriages.
Individual characteristics
Countries are heterogeneous with respect to correlates of interfaith marriages, as education levels
and urban residence also capture the likelihood of being a member of “other (faith)” in most
countries. Consistent with results on the pooled sample, urban residence and secondary education
are negatively correlated to the likelihood of being in an interfaith union in most countries, and
signs on primary schooling differ across countries. Contrasting with these results, education levels
and urban residence are either insignificant or positively correlated with the likelihood of being in
a Muslim-Christian marriage, thus mirroring results on individual characteristics associated with
marrying outside of one’s ethnic group.
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Table 5: Trend - Observed interfaith marriage shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Interfaith marriage Interfaith marriage
Muslim/Christian/Others Mean Muslim-Christian Mean N
Birth year Each cell: coefficient from a separate regression
coefficient
Panel A: Increase in interethnic marriage shares
Panel A1: Decrease in interfaith marriage shares
Benin -0.150** -0.103 16.7 0.0430 0.0396 2.9 10977
(0.0754) (0.0753) (0.0332) (0.0341)
Ghana -1.520*** -1.301*** 18.3 -0.167*** -0.172*** 2.8 6487
(0.133) (0.131) (0.0581) (0.0585)
Kenya -0.189*** -0.123*** 6.4 0.0112 -0.00311 1.0 9169
(0.0445) (0.0451) (0.0174) (0.0173)
Togo -0.214** -0.0945 18.9 0.0585** 0.0512* 1.2 3701
(0.109) (0.112) (0.0248) (0.0284)
Panel A2: No change in interfaith marriage shares
Cote d’Ivoire 0.122 0.148 19.3 0.0544 0.0616 2.6 2677
(0.134) (0.134) (0.0472) (0.0474)
Guinea 0.0423 0.0481 5.1 0.0167 0.00898 0.9 4732
(0.122) (0.122) (0.0268) (0.0271)
Mali 0.00585 -0.000175 6.2 0.0198 0.0201 1.1 8499
(0.0660) (0.0659) (0.0257) (0.0252)
Senegal -0.0399 -0.0469 1.9 -0.0222 -0.0281 1.3 7777
(0.0594) (0.0585) (0.0516) (0.0500)
Uganda 0.0496 0.0140 5.7 0.0948* 0.0572 4.3 2465
(0.0570) (0.0603) (0.0501) (0.0507)
Panel A3: Increase in interfaith marriage shares
Cameroon 0.489** 0.523** 10.8 0.0439 0.0467 1.6 3066
(0.233) (0.236) (0.0840) (0.0870)
Panel B: No change in interethnic marriage shares
Panel B1: Decrease in interfaith marriage shares
Burkina Faso -0.251*** -0.237*** 12.1 0.00294 -0.0213 3.6 9170
(0.0898) (0.0894) (0.0447) (0.0451)
Gabon -0.570** -0.402 18.6 0.0729 0.0402 4.0 2274
(0.239) (0.244) (0.118) (0.128)
Zambia -0.161*** -0.146*** 4.4 -0.0123 -0.0126 0.5 10711
(0.0496) (0.0492) (0.0188) (0.0191)
Panel B2: No change in interfaith marriage shares
Malawi -0.123 -0.0130 7.8 0.0250 0.0432 2.2 9241
(0.0786) (0.0816) (0.0370) (0.0383)
Niger 0.0912 0.0962* 1.8 -0.00343 -0.00439 0.4 5603
(0.0572) (0.0567) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Controls
Age & Age2 D D D D
Education D D
Urban D D
Remarried D D
Sample & data: Women currently in union, weighted DHS data at country level. Specification: OLS regression run separately for the 15
countries of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the DHS-cluster level.
Columns (1) to (2): Dependent variable is a variable that equals 0 is the union is intrafaith, 100 if the union is interfaith, considering three
religious groups (Christians, Muslims, Other (faiths)). Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficient associated to the birth year variable. Each
cell corresponds to a separate regression. Column (3) reports the mean number of interfaith marriages.
Columns (4) to (5): Dependent variable is a variable that equals 0 is the union is a Muslim-Christian union, 100 if the union is not. Columns
(4) and (5) report the coefficient associated to the birth year variable. Each cell corresponds to a separate regression. Column (6) reports
the mean number of Muslim-Christian marriages. Column (7) reports the number of observations for each country.
Results in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) can be interpreted as changes in percentage points.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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7 Robustness analysis
I implement four robustness checks on my findings. First, I relax the assumption that a marriage
is intraethnic or intrafaith when both spouses belong to the group “other”. Second, I test whether
the results are robust to alternative assumptions on remarried women’s first unions and whether
the trends are also found when considering separately women in their first union and remarried
women. Third, using only women in their first union, I test whether “assimilation” and conversion
take place over the length of a marriage. Fourth, using only women in their first union, I compare
time trends measured using birth year and using cohabitation year. Table 6 displays results from
the main specification and from the regressions when varying the assumptions as mentioned above.
For brevity, the results are presented for the pooled sample. A full discussion of the country-level
results can be found in the online Appendix.
7.1 Testing for heterogeneity in the “other” group
The categories “other ethnicity” and “other faith” are categories that are more heterogeneous than
other categories. In the main specification, I assume that when both spouses belong to the group
“other”, their union is in-group. Assuming that these unions are in fact out-group unions (“other-
other” assumption), more unions appear as intermarriages. Figure 8 shows the comparison of
intermarriage shares using the main assumption and using the “other-other” assumption: more
unions are now counted as interethnic and as interfaith, thus providing an upper bound on the
share of such unions.
In table 6, columns (1) and (2) are similar to columns (3) and (4): the results regarding
the pooled sample are robust to counting the “other”-“other” unions as inter-group unions. The
absolute magnitude of the coefficient is higher under the “other-other” assumption, especially for
interfaith marriages, which is consistent with the overall decrease in the share of “other (faith)”.
At the country level, the main results carry through. There is no country for which the share of
interethnic marriages decreased. The trend on interfaith marriages in Niger turns positive and
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significant, which is consistent with the fact that the share of “other (faith)” increased over time in
this country.
Figure 8: Shares of interethnic/interfaith marriages over birth cohort
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Sample & data: Women in union, pooled sample. 95% confidence intervals included.
Left panel: Interethnic marriages. Right panel: Interfaith marriages.
Bound high: Shares under the assumption that all remarried women were in interethnic/interfaith first unions. Bound
low: Shares under the assumption that all remarried women were in intraethnic/intrafaith first unions. Bound other:
Shares under the assumption that when both spouses belong to the group “other”, they are in an interethnic/interfaith
union.
7.2 Testing the remarriage story
Women remarry either after a divorce or after being widowed. As such, remarriage is a function
of age – older women are more likely to be widows – and may also be a function of the character-
istics of a woman’s first union – intermarriages may be more likely to end by a divorce21.The age
controls do not capture the fact that some unions may be more likely to end than others: cohort
composition effects might bias the estimated time trends. Remarried women are more likely to be
in an interethnic (interfaith) marriage than women in their first marriage, but it might be that they
have already been in a (first) marriage which was interethnic (interfaith). To understand better
how remarriage patterns affect my results, I study bounds on the estimates and use a sub-sample
analysis.
First, I bound my estimates by making assumptions on first unions of remarried women. Fig-
ure 8 depicts how the different assumptions affect intermarriage shares. The “higher bound” as-
21 Whether spouses belong to the same group might affect the likelihood of divorce. However, not all remarried
women have divorced, some were widowed. Interethnic unions are associated to lower age gaps between spouses, to a
higher likelihood to live in an urban area, and to higher education levels: it is likely that intraethnic marriages are more
likely to be ended by the husband’s death than interethnic marriages are.
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sumption assigns an interethnic union to all of the women who have remarried. The “lower bound”
assumption assigns an intraethnic union to all of the women who have remarried. Three points
must be noted on these assumptions. First, they are extreme assumptions: either 100% or 0% of
remarried women are assumed to have had an interethnic (interfaith) first marriage while 25.6%
of them are in an interethnic marriage at survey date and 13.1% in an interfaith one. Second, the
“higher bound” assumption on interethnic marriages is an extreme assumption as the ratio of the
share of remarried women who have married outside of their group to the share of not-remarried
women who have married outside of their group changes over birth cohorts.Third, there is a trend
on remarriage. When regressing the Remarried variable on the year of birth, and quadratic age
controls, there is a negative and significant trend: the share of remarried women is higher in
earlier-born cohorts than in later-born cohorts, even when age is controlled for22. It means that
the “higher bound” assumption works against finding a positive trend and that the “lower bound”
assumption works in favor of finding a positive trend.
Table 6 (columns (5) to (8)) shows the coefficient on birth year under these two assumptions.
Under the “lower bound” assumption, the trend on interethnic marriages remains positive and sig-
nificant. However, under the “higher bound” assumption, there is no trend on interethnic (first)
marriages, and a significant negative trend (of small magnitude) once education and urban res-
idence are controlled for. At the country-level, the time trends turn negative and significant in
Benin, Senegal, and Togo, resulting on the insignificant trend on the pooled sample. As the trend
on interethnic marriages is barely negative and significant under the “higher bound” assumption
that works in favor of finding a negative trend, it is extremely unlikely that interethnic first mar-
riages became less frequent over time, and unlikely that their share remained constant. The trend
on interfaith marriages remains negative and significant under both assumptions. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of the coefficient drops under the “lower bound” assumption, as expected. The results
22Two factors are likely to explain this trend on the share of remarried women. First, widowhood being a less common
experience due to changes in life expectancy. Second, not remarrying may be an option that is accessible to a higher
share of later-born women than to their earlier-born counterparts.
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on interfaith marriages at the country-level are robust to these bounds.
Second, I test whether the trends that I observe come from remarried women or from women
in their first union (columns (9) to (11), and columns (13) and (14), Table 6). There are trends
in all of the sub-samples. Such trends are not found for all of the countries, a result that may
stem from differences between countries and sub-samples, or from the fact that the sample size
is too small in the remarried sub-sample. I find no sub-sample in which the trend on interethnic
marriages is negative and significant. Regarding interfaith marriages, the trend is positive and
significant only for remarried Nigerien women and for Cameroonian women.
Even if we believe that the results from the “higher bound” assumption on interethnic first mar-
riages are correct and hence that the share of interethnic first marriages did not change over time,
the results from the sub-sample analysis show that there is a positive and significant trend when
considering remarriages, even when education and urban residence are controlled for. These re-
sults are consistent with the hypothesis that women who remarry have more of a say on whom
they marry, and that social norms around interethnic marriages have relaxed over time. These re-
sults may also capture changes in the composition of the remarried sub-sample: among remarried
women, the share of widows is likely to be higher in earlier-born cohorts than in later-born co-
horts, the share of divorcees is likely to be lower in earlier-born cohorts than in later-born cohorts.
Divorced women might have different preferences from widows, and they may also be more likely
to choose to whom they remarry.
7.3 Testing the “assimilation”/conversion story
Older women have spent more time in a union than younger women: as spouses spend a longer
time in a union, their ethnic or religious identity may change. I cannot test for explanations about
conversion or “assimilation” that take place before cohabitation or marriage, but I can test these
two channels during the time in union. Exploiting the fact that there are at least two survey waves
for each country, I can study whether women who married for the first time the same year and
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Table 6: Robustness checks on interethnic marriages and interfaith marriages – Pooled sample
Regression results - Dependent variable: Interethnic marriage - Each cell: birth year coefficient from a separate regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Sample All married women First union Remarried
Assumptions Main Main Bound Other Higher bound Lower bound Main Main Main Main Main Main
Dependent variable: Interethnic marriage
Birth year 0.265*** 0.168*** 0.296*** 0.228*** -0.00227 -0.0808* 0.268*** 0.157*** 0.263*** 0.135*** 0.212*** 0.353*** 0.302***
(0.0421) (0.0403) (0.0514) (0.0501) (0.0457) (0.0445) (0.0369) (0.0351) (0.0437) (0.0415) (0.0433) (0.101) (0.0981)
Year of cohabitation 0.174***
(0.0357)
Number of years since cohabitation -0.0597
(0.0458)
Age at cohabitation 0.821***
(0.0799)
Share interethnic marriages 20.4 27.9 32.5 16.2 19.4 25.6
Dependent variable: Interfaith marriage
Birth year -0.179*** -0.149*** -0.402*** -0.299*** -0.354*** -0.304*** -0.0960*** -0.0789*** -0.146*** -0.123*** -0.146*** -0.273*** -0.268***
(0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0394) (0.0388) (0.0416) (0.0413) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0776) (0.0778)
Year of cohabitation -0.0796***
(0.0252)
Number of years since cohabitation -0.221***
(0.0329)
Age at cohabitation -0.258***
(0.0545)
Share interfaith marriages 9.7 15.5 23.8 7.6 9.1 13.1
Country fixed-effects D D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Age & Age2 D D D D D D D D D D D D D
Education & Urban D D D D D D D
Remarried D
Data & sample: Women in union, pooled sample. Weighted data.
Specification: OLS regression. Standard errors are clustered at the DHS-cluster level. As the specification includes country-fixed effects, there is no constant in the model. Dependent variable is a variable that equals 0 is the union is
intraethnic (intrafaith), 100 if the union is interethnic (interfaith). Definition of the dependent variable varies in specifications (1) to (8). Results are estimated under the main specification, but on two sub-samples in columns (9) to
(14).
Columns (1) to (10) and (13) and (14) report the coefficient associated to the birth year variable.
Column (11) reports the coefficient associated to the birth year variable, as well as the number of years since first cohabitation and the age at first cohabitation.
Column (12) reports the coefficient associated to the year of first cohabitation variable.
(1), (2): Main specification, All women: Dependent variable: Interethnic (interfaith) marriages as observed in the data.
(3), (4): Other bound, All women: Dependent variable: Interethnic (interfaith) marriages, with “other”-“other” unions counted as interethnic ones.
(5), (6) : Higher bound, All women: Dependent variable: Interethnic (interfaith) marriages, with all women who remarried counted as being in an interethnic (intrafaith) union.
(7), (8): Lower bound, All women: Dependent variable: Interethnic (interfaith) marriages, with all women who remarried counted as being in an intraethnic (intrafaith) union.
(9), (10), (11), (12): Main specification, First unions: Only women in their first union.
(13), (14): Main specification, Remarried: Only women who have remarried.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
were born the same year are more (less) likely to report having the same ethnic (religious) group
as their husband when the length of union increases. However, the identification ultimately rests
on differences across survey waves, so this also captures any effect linked to survey waves.
Table 6 (column (11)) shows results from the regression of the Intermarriage variables on
birth year, length of union, and age at first union. Comparing column (9) to column (11), I find
that the time trends are robust to controlling for length of union and age at first union.
The coefficient of the number of years since cohabitation is not significant for interethnic mar-
riages but is negative and significant for interfaith marriages. Therefore, in the case of interethnic
marriages, “assimilation” and selective divorces seem unlikely. In the case of interfaith marriages,
the longer the union, the more likely it is that spouses have the same faith. This result is consistent
with the fact that the share of “other (faith)” decreased over time: conversion during marriage may
be one of the mechanisms that is behind this decrease. Another hypothesis would be that interfaith
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unions are more likely to break than intrafaith unions, but this hypothesis does not account for the
decline in traditional religions.
Concerning the age at first cohabitation, women who were older when they started cohabiting
are more likely to be in an interethnic union, which is consistent with the fact that these women
are more educated and more likely to live in an urban area than their counterparts, and that these
characteristics are positively correlated to the likelihood of being in an interethnic union. Older
women at the time of their first cohabitation are less likely to be in an interfaith union, which is
consistent with the fact that they are less likely to belong to a traditional religion.
7.4 Testing Birth year v. Cohabitation year
The start of cohabitation may be a better measure of norms at the time that the union started:
it corresponds to what people may perceive, such as the fact that more (less) people are getting
married outside of their group. However, cohabitation year is less exogenous than birth year, and
age at marriage is higher for later-born cohorts, leading these cohorts to start cohabiting at even
later dates. In table 6, comparing columns (10) to (12), the results are robust to using cohabitation
year instead of birth year on the sample of women who are still in their first union. At the country-
level, the results are robust to using cohabitation year instead of birth year. Cohabitation year
appears to indeed be endogenous to education and urban residence. When using cohabitation year
rather than birth year, there is a trend in all of the countries except Burkina Faso and Niger, but
after controlling for education and urban residence, this effect remains significant in the countries
where there was a trend using birth year and in Gabon. After controlling for education and urban
residence, the trends estimated on interfaith marriages are different depending on whether birth
year or cohabitation year is used only in Cote d’Ivoire and in Senegal.
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8 Concluding remarks
This paper documents patterns of interethnic and interfaith marriages in sub-Saharan African
countries. I use data from Demographic and Health Surveys that gather information on mari-
tal history, education and geographic location to build a sample of women born between 1955 and
1989. I find that the share of interethnic marriages varies between countries but that such unions
are not uncommon: 20.4% of women are married to a man who is not from the same ethnic group
as them, contrasting with 9.7% of women who are married to someone who does not share their
faith, and 2.1% of women in Muslim-Christian marriages.
Studying marital outcomes of women born between 1955 and 1989, I find that interethnic
marriages became more common in half of the sample, and that their share remained constant in
the other half. This study concludes that higher educational achievements and widespread urban-
ization contributed to that increase, but that these changes cannot explain all of the it, suggesting
that ethnic cleavages may lose salience in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Linguistic distance
for intermarried couples increased in some countries, suggesting that all ethnic boundaries were
lessened. In other countries, linguistic distance decreased: boundaries between groups that are
close in terms of linguistic distance disappear and boundaries with other groups may be reinforced.
As interethnic marriage shares are far from rare and are even increasing in half of the countries
of the sample, using ethnicity as a proxy for a strong identification with one single group may be
misguided. In contrast, interfaith marriages are becoming less common, a fact that can mostly
be attributed to the conversion of former followers of traditional religions to Islam or Christian-
ity, thus resulting in lower levels of religious diversity. The share of Muslim-Christian marriages
remains low and has not changed in most countries. However, new religious groups, especially
new religious branches within Christianity, are being separately counted in recent survey waves:
religious boundaries within faith groups may become more salient as a result of the expansion of
Christianity and Islam.
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Future research could aim at studying marriages that are intrafaith but interdenominational.
An additional strand of research could focus on better understanding the channels by which ed-
ucation and urbanization impact the likelihood of marrying outside one’s own ethnic group: Are
cities different from rural areas because they are more heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity? Or do
people living in cities have more agency to choose a partner? Are educated women more likely
to marry outside of their ethnic group because they have more agency in choosing a spouse or
because they accessed more mixed markets by attending higher education institutions? Related
work could investigate whether marrying outside one’s own ethnic group is the result of strategic
behavior (Luke and Munshi [2006]). Are urban-dwellers turning away from membership in their
ethnic group to benefit from their membership in a religious group? Faith groups or networks
related to attending the same church or mosque could also be an opportunity to access jobs and
support. Deepening our understanding of whether marriage decisions reinforce or change identity
affiliations would bring important contributions to the political economy literature on conflict, as
well as to the literature on networks.
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Appendix A Data
Table 7: Data description by survey wave
Survey Ethnicity Religion Remarried Survey Ethnicity Religion Remarried
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Benin 1996 9 11 4.4 7 35.9 20.0 Malawi 2000 9 11 7.7 8 2.6 24.6
Benin 2001 9 11 4.4 7 28.2 18.7 Malawi 2004 9 9 7.6 8 1.5 19.9
Benin 2006 9 11 4.3 11 27.5 14.5 Malawi 2010 9 14 6.8 9 1.9 21.2
Benin 2011 9 10 1.8 10 22.0 9.7 Malawi 2015 9 11 5.6 8 0.5 23.6
Benin 2017 9 10 5.1 10 16.7 14.3 Mali 1995 10 12 10.5 4 8.3 12.7
Burkina Faso 1993 10 12 7.5 5 20.1 13.2 Mali 2000 10 11 4.5 5 4.4 12.5
Burkina Faso 1998 10 19 11.2 5 18.3 13.5 Mali 2010 10 14 5.6 6 6.1 14.0
Burkina Faso 2003 10 12 7.8 5 14.0 11.3 Mali 2012 10 13 6.9 8 3.3 6.3
Burkina Faso 2010 10 17 13.2 6 9.6 10.3 Niger 1992 7 12 2.5 4 0.3 29.5
Cameroon 1998 23 43 24.1 6 11.5 19.5 Niger 1998 7 11 1.7 4 0.7 24.9
Cameroon 2004 23 48 21.3 8 10.9 19.2 Niger 2006 7 9 1.1 4 1.3 17.7
Cote d’Ivoire 1994 14 44 44.3 5 29.0 16.8 Senegal 1992b 7 9 5.3 23.5
Cote d’Ivoire 2011 14 56 46.8 9 18.3 14.7 Senegal 2005 7 9 8.3 2 0.0 19.4
Gabon 2000 9 10 26.6 7 12.2 29.1 Senegal 2010 7 8 9.4 4 0.7 12.0
Gabon 2012 9 11 31.7 8 5.1 25.3 Senegal 2014 7 8 5.1 3 0.5 12.7
Ghana 1993 8 13 3.7 7 23.5 23.9 Senegal 2015 7 8 7.7 3 1.0 12.8
Ghana 1998 8 13 4.7 9 15.6 23.9 Senegal 2016 7 8 6.6 3 0.5 12.4
Ghana 2003 8 10 8.6 9 11.0 22.1 Senegal 2017 7 8 9.0 4 0.0 13.5
Ghana 2008 8 10 4.7 11 9.8 19.3 Togo 1998 6 7 8.6 7 48.5 22.1
Ghana 2014 8 9 3.3 10 6.4 21.1 Togo 2013 6 8 6.8 13 28.9 15.7
Guinea 1999 7 8 1.3 5 7.3 15.0 Uganda 1996 20 32 10.4 5 1.4 21.5
Guinea 2005 7 8 1.1 4 6.1 16.6 Uganda 2016 20 47 11.1 11 0.9 22.3
Guinea 2012 7 7 3.8 5 7.4 15.6 Zambia 1996 31 46 6.8 6 1.8 17.8
Kenya 1993 11 12 4.7 6 3.7 5.2 Zambia 2001 31 48 8.1 6 1.5 18.3
Kenya 1998a 10 11 4.8 6 3.0 4.5 Zambia 2007 31 52 6.2 5 1.2 16.0
Kenya 2003 11 15 7.1 6 2.7 5.8 Zambia 2013 31 54 5.3 5 1.0 17.9
Kenya 2008 11 14 4.5 5 2.7 4.9
Kenya 2014 11 23 6.2 5 1.6 7.2
Note: This table lists all survey waves included in the main sample, and presents results useful to understand recoding
choices across waves.
Sample: Women in union at the time of the survey.
Ethnicity: Columns (1) and (7): Number of ethnic groups in the common classification (at least one married woman and
one married man in each survey wave and each birth cohort). Columns (2) and (8): Number of ethnic groups with at least
one woman listed in the DHS classification. Columns (3) and (9): Share of women belonging to the “other (ethnicity)”
group (includes foreigners) in the common classification.
Religion: Columns (4) and (10): Number of religious groups with at least one woman listed in the DHS classification.
Common classification is made up of three groups for all waves. except Senegal 2005, where Christian and Others are pulled
together. Columns (5) and (11): Share of women belonging to the “other (faith)” group in the common classification.
Remarriage: Columns (6) and (12): Share of remarried women.
a The only Somali people in this wave are two men: this wave is not representative of the north-east of Kenya.
b Religious affiliation not included in questionnaire. I use a different set of weights when not using this wave.
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Appendix B Linguistic distance measures
Figure 9: Ethnolinguistic tree for groups listed in DHS Benin
“Proto-Human”
Niger-Congo
Nilo-Saharan
Songhai
Southern
Dendi
Atlantic-Congo
Atlantic
Northern
Senegambian
Fulani-Wolof
Fula
West Central
Peulh
Volta-Congo
Benue-Congo
Defoid
Yoruboid
Edekiri
Yoruba
North
Central
Northern
Oti-Volta
Eastern
Betamaribe
Southern
Grusi
Eastern
Yoa & Lopka
Gur
Bariba
Bariba
Kwa
Left Bank
Gbe
Fon
Fon
Aja
Adja
The names in bold are the names of the ethnic groups listed in DHS Benin. The names in italic are the names of linguistic
groups the ethnic groups were matched to.
Gershman and Rivera [2018] describe the specificity of linguistic trees in the case of ethnolinguis-
tic groups in sub-Saharan Africa. While languages have not always been associated with ethnicity
(Canut [2002]), there is currently a strong association between languages (or language groups)
and ethnic groups. First, I match each group listed the recoded DHS classification to the corre-
sponding linguistic group according to the information listed in the Ethnologue dictionary (Simons
and Fennig [2017]). Second, I compute the linguistic distance of each pair of linguistic groups
within a country.
I define linguistic distance between two groups as the mean number of nodes to their first
common subfamily. The number of nodes is computed from the linguistic group level. For instance,
the linguistic distance between the ethnic groups Adja and Fon, in Benin, is 1 (one step needed to
go to the last common linguistic subfamily: Aja-Gbe (1) and Fon-Gbe (1)). The linguistic distance
between Kamba and Kikuyu is 0 (they share a subfamily: Kikuyu-Kamba). The linguistic distance
between Kalenjin and Luo is 4.5 (the average of the distance Kalenjin-Nilotic (3) and Luo-Nilotic
(6)).
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When computing the value of the observed linguistic distance, if one spouse does not belong
to any identified ethnic group, but her/his partner does, I define the linguistic distance between
them as the mean linguistic distance of intermarried couples within the country. When computing
the value of the random linguistic distance, I define the linguistic distance of couples in which only
one spouse is “other (ethnicity)” as the median value of the defined distances at the language pair
level.
Figure 10: Ethnolinguistic tree for groups listed in DHS Kenya.
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The names in bold are the names of the ethnic groups listed in DHS Kenya. The names in italic are the names of linguistic
groups the ethnic groups were matched to.
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